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This thesis describes the Defense Data Network (DDN) and its possible applications
for the Naval Security Group. It reviews the background and historical information that
contributed to the selection of DDN as the primary long distance data communications
system for the Department of Defense. It evaluates some of the advantages and
disadvantages of packet switching technology. The survivability, availability, and
security features ofDDN are presented. Also included are specifications of the hardware
equipment, software standards, and operating procedures for DDN. The Naval Security
Group does not require direct DDN access to accomplish its operational mission. There
are, however, a number of nonoperational requirements that could be facilitated by
direct DDN access. This thesis discusses a potential role for DDN in the Naval Security
Group. Applications for administration, personnel, supply, and logistics functions are
provided. Uses for the electronic mail, remote access, and file transfer networking
functions of DDN are also proposed. Potential benefits resulting from DDN access are
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A. DEFENSE DATA NETWORK
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) communications system is in a
period of transition from its aging Automatic Digital Information Network
(AUTODIN) to the new Defense Data Network (DDN). This transition involves record
message traffic and data communications processed by most DoD Agencies. In order
to use available resources effectively, a replacement project of such large magnitude
requires much planning by program managers as well as prospective users. The purpose
of this thesis is to investigate possible applications of DDN for the U.S. Naval Security
Group Command; the intended audience is Navy managers and planners associated with
the Security Group. Readers affiliated with other organizations also may obtain relevant
information concerning transitions to DDN. The sources from which this information
has been compiled include: published articles on various aspects of DDN, briefings
presented at the 1987 Navy DDN Program Management Review, and interviews with
Naval Security Group managers representing Security Group headquarters and field
stations.
DDN is a replacement for AUTODIN, but it is also a great deal more. It uses a
revolutionary new type of switching technology, called packet switching, and has
modern networking capabilities which are not available on AUTODIN. These enhanced
network functions include electronic mail, the ability to send notes between individual
users; telnet, the ability to access information at a remote location; and file transfer
protocol, the ability to transfer complete stored files from one network user to another.
It is the availability of these new functions which prompts this research into direct
accession to DDN by the Naval Security Group.
B. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP
Naval Security Group, the cryptologic element of the U.S. Navy, supports Fleet
Staffs and operates commands, departments, and detachments worldwide in various
types of facilities. There is presently no plan for these entities to gain direct access to
DDN and this access is not necessary for the Security Group's operational mission. But
in light of DDN's advanced capabilities and the fact that most other Navy commands
may soon be capitalizing on electronic mail and the other new network functions, it is
worthwhile to view DDN as a potential resource on an administrative basis. This study
makes recommendations concerning the feasibility and appropriateness of connectivity
to DDN by Naval Security Group organizations.
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The goals of this thesis are
1. To introduce DDN and its features to Naval Security Group personnel.
2. To identify possible DDN applications for Naval Security Group elements.
3. To provide Naval Security Group managers with enough information to consider
DDN access for their commands.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter contains the background information that forms the foundation of this
research. The first section discusses current trends towards the integration of computer
and communication networks; it is presented so that this thesis will be relevant to
planners involved with human-to-human and human-to-computer, as well as
computer-to-computer applications. A short history and explanation of the technology
of the DDN is included in the second section in order to provide a basis for future
discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the various components of the
Naval Security Group Command are introduced.
A. NETWORKING
The term network is defined by Stoner as the linking of groups of computers, either
within an organization or between multiple organizations, so that they can communicate
with each other and share common data bases and resources [Ref. 1: p. 693]. That
author also uses the term networking to represent an individual's sphere of influence,
both received and dispersed. In the context of this study, it is worthwhile to consider
networking as both a hardware and an interpersonal resource. Being able to share
common data bases and broaden a network o[ associates enhances the likelihood of a
member of any organization fulfilling the premise that "...it is both what you know and
who you know that counts" [Ref. 1: p. 553]. DDN offers many networking functions,
but it is important first to realize current applications of networks in general so that the
study of specific choices involving DDN options can be made in proper perspective.
Networks can be configured to connect individuals within an organization or to link
separate organizations together. User-oriented networks within a centralized
organization are commonly referred to as local area networks. Long-distance, or
long-haul, networks are usually public utilities for many organizations and can
sometimes even provide worldwide services. The local area network configuration is
rapidly replacing the direct access of individual terminals to the DDN.
This integration of local area considerations into the overall scheme of long-haul
networks has emphasized the need for interoperability between networks. The merger
of the fields of computer science and data communications, which occurred during the
1970s and 1980s, also has emphasized the need for interoperability among managers of
each discipline. The merger is discussed by Stallings who states that the
computer-communications revolution has occurred and has produced the following
results:
• There is no fundamental difference between data processing (computers) and data
communications (transmission and switching equipment).
• There are no fundamental differences among data, voice, and video
communications.
• The lines between single-processor computer, multiprocessor computer, local
network, metropolitan network, and long-haul network have blurred. [Ref. 2:
p. 1]
Accepting these assumptions, this paper proceeds to analyze DDN as an integrated
communications system that is easily accessible to different forms of data and
information. In fact, long-range planners within the Defense Department foresee the
DDN evolving with the new Defense Switched Network to form a fully integrated data
and voice network [Ref. 3: p. 35.1.1].
B. DEFENSE DATA NETWORK
DoD communications managers should become acquainted with the evolution and
mechanics of the DDN, since it will eventually provide connectivity for all DoD entities.
Familiarization with past and projected network structures as well as with the DDN
technology will assist individual managers in making wise decisions during the
establishment of smooth transition plans for each DoD organization.
DDN is not only of interest to DoD communications managers but is also
important to computer system managers. Investigation into the evolution of DDN
reveals that efficient use of computer facilities and interoperability between subscriber
resources were high priorities during the developmental stages of DDN [Ref. 4:
p. 15.5.1]. The DDN historical and technological information presented here should
prove useful to both communication and computer systems managers.
1. History
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated a packet switched
network in 1969 as an intra-agency communications system and as an experiment
investigating new technologies. Members of this research community, mindful of the
need to share information and aware of the benefits of accessible databases, desired to
employ true networking functions on a cross-continental basis. Networking functions
(such as office automation and file transfers) had previously been employed only in local
area networks consisting of similar types of computers. But the research agency's
network, known as ARPANET, proved that users of different types of computers could
share programs and communicate over long distances [Ref. 5: p. 8].
ARPANET grew rapidly, allowed participation outside the agency, and gained
acceptance by many operational users. As a result of this success, in 1975 the Defense
Communications Agency (DCA) assumed responsibility for the network. Throughout
this time period (1969-1980) DCA also developed plans for a replacement
ALTODIN II system which would use packet switching technology. In 1981, DCA
initiated a study comparing the planned ALTODIN II to ARPANET. It was no
longer beneficial to support the development of two packet-switched networks, so, based
on risk, cost, and expandability, the study ruled in favor of ARPANET'S proven
technology over the ALTODIN II plans. The DDN project was started and
ALTODIN II was canceled in April 1982.
The core of DDN was the existing ARPANET, and its war and peacetime
mission is to provide the DoD reliable, survivable, and secure worldwide
communications service and the ability to transmit according to precedence
requirements [Ref. 6: pp. 59-60]. Building on an existing network enabled DDN project
managers to realize an early availability date and to benefit from some on-line
experience. However, use of ARPANET also prevented some ground-zero decisions
concerning standard network protocols and necessitated the inclusion of equipment that
was already becoming obsolete.
The future DDN does not depend on the early success of ARPANET, but
instead relies on continued evolution and incorporation of today's ever-improving
hardware and software technologies. Hurlburt cites the overwhelming effect of too
many software options in particular as the downfall of ALTODIN II [Ref. 7: p. 62].
DCA now has the challenge of keeping all branches of DDN standardized while
continuing to offer innovations to users.
The commitment to DDN by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was
declared in a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments dated
March 10, 1983. The memorandum states:
All DoD automatic data processing systems and data networks requiring data
communication services will be provided long haul and area communications,
interconnectivity, and the capability for interoperability by the DDN. Existing
systems, systems being expanded and upgraded, and new automatic data processing
systems or data networks will become DDN subscribers. [Ref. 8: p. 1]
Present guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense is still consistent with this
memorandum. DoD communities are just beginning to connect to DDN. As the
network continues to expand, more DoD personnel will become DDN users
(subscribers).
When the DDN project was initiated in response to the Secretary of Defense
Memorandum, the research segment of the network retained the name ARPANET, and
the operational user network was designated as the Military Network (MILNET). There
are now other segments of DDN and each one continues to expand. Some examples
of DDN segments include the Strategic Air Command Digital Network, Worldwide
Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network Communications
Subsystem, and the DoD Intelligence Information System. These DoD communities
established their own networks in order to contain classified information to a limited
environment. They are physically separate networks, managed by DCA, but not yet
consolidated into a true DoD network. Gateway devices currently under development
will eventually allow internetworking between communities. Figure 1 on page 7 shows
an internetwork environment.
The physical structure of DDN consists of backbone and access networks. The
backbone refers to the centralized core ofDDN that allows data to travel long distances.
It consists of relay stations (packet switching nodes) connected by terrestrial or satellite
communications links (interswitch trunks). The users' terminals, computers, and
connecting circuits comprise the DDN access components. Figure 2 on page 8
illustrates the backbone and access framework.
The DDN segments handling information at various levels of classification
presently have physically separate backbones. However, the planned incorporation in
1988 of end-to-end encryption equipment, known as Blacker devices, will enable
information from a sensitive network to traverse the same interswitch trunk as does
information from the unclassified MILNET segment [Ref. 6: p. 60].
The classification of DDN into its various community-of-interest segments and
into its hardware configurations highlights the challenges facing project management in
the area of interoperability. True DDN interoperability would mean that a user from
any DoD community could use DDN resources to communicate with a user from any
other DoD entity. As program manager, DCA provides the node computers and leases
appropriate telephone lines for communication among backbone components. DCA
must also ensure interoperability among the various military service subscribers who















Figure 1. DoD Internetworking Environment. [Ref. 9: p. 4- 10a).
provide their own terminals, modems, and host computers to access DDN (Ref. 5:
P . 9].
2. Technology
Communications systems provide paths to relay information between users.
Today's transmission paths travel through cables, microwave antennas, and satellites.
Networks conserve these resources by using one transmission path to connect many
users. The process of changing a given path from one point-to-point link to another is
known as switching.
Three common forms of switching techniques are circuit switching, message
switching, and packet switching. Circuit switching involves the actual physical switching
of network resources while message and packet switching refer to the selection of a route
over available resources. ARPANET pioneered packet switching technology, and DDN
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Figure 2. DDN Backbone and Access Structure. [Ref. 9 p 5-4a]
continues to capitalize on this extremely efficient method. A useful way to describe
packet switching is to compare it to existing systems.
The most familiar communications system is the DoD telephone network, called
Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), that uses circuit switching technology. Each
time a call is placed, switching centers connect a circuit between the sender and receiver.
This provides a dedicated link that is well suited to interactive voice conversations. The
conversations will not be interrupted unless precedence requirements warrant. Then the
AUTOVON svstem mav switch circuit resources from a routine call to one of hiaher
priority. Circuit switching is not very efficient because only two users exploit the
available transmission equipment and bandwidth of any path at any given time. [Ref. 9:
pp. 2-1,2-2]
The AUTODIN system uses message switching technology. Each message is
entered into the system as a unit and travels an established route from its source to the
nearest AUTODIN switching center. The 15 AUTODIN switching centers located
worldwide act as hubs to direct messages to the switching center nearest to the intended
message destination. Message switching allows the paths between switching centers to
serve many users simultaneously. This is more efficient than circuit switching but does
not allow users to interact on a timely basis. [Ref. 9: pp. 2-3,2-4] DDN's packet
switching technology makes message switching even more efficient by dividing messages
into smaller packets that are routed individually.
In addition to routing information as smaller segments, DDN also has a more
distributed structure than AUTODIN. DDN consists of hundreds of switching nodes
that can process the packets, while AUTODIN has only 15 switching centers to
accomplish its message switching routines. DDN packet route selections are dynamic;
each packet travels the most expeditious route at any given time.
In terms of time savings, the packet transits can be compared to people driving
their own cars instead of waiting to travel together on a bus. Messages that currently
stack up in queue at AUTODIN switching centers will bypass busy or inoperative
packet switching nodes and speed along to their destinations on the DDN system. A
limited number of roads and use of a separate car for each person can cause vehicular
traffic jams; similarly, an efficient transportation system for information must have
sufficient capacity and a reasonable amount of data included in each packet.
The ability of DDN's routing algorithm to adapt to changing network
configurations contributes to its survivability, reliability, and flexibility. The fact that
each interswitch trunk passes interleaved bits of many messages instead of complete
communications or data transfers enhances the security aspect of the DDN. These
attributes were the basis for the selection of DDN as a major telecommunications
resource for DoD. As DDN gains acceptance throughout the military services, organ-
izations such as the Naval Security Group should carefully consider what DDN has to
offer.
C. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP
Background information presented in this section serves two purposes. First, it
provides an introduction for readers who may not be familiar with the Naval Security
Group Command. Second, it should help readers who are associated with the Security
Group consider this thesis in the context of the Naval Security Group as an entire
organization, not on the basis of the reader's viewpoint which may be limited to that of
an administrator, communicator, engineer, or operator.
Naval activities that report to the Commander of the Naval Security Group vary in
size and are located throughout the world. An understanding of the structure of the
Naval Security Group is necessary in order to evaluate proposals related to networking
on a naval base level, at a type commander level (such as Commander, Naval Security
Group), or on a Navy-wide level.
1. Organization
The Offices of the Secretary of Defense are responsible for ensuring
interoperability among services and overall support of national interests, while the
individual military departments use their allotted manpower and equipment to
accomplish specific missions. DCA is DoD's vehicle for overall management of the
Defense Communication System, and the Naval Telecommunications Command is the
Navy's long-haul communications authority. The Commander, Naval
Telecommunications Command, reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations for
configuration control of the Naval Telecommunications System, and is the Navy's
program manager for the DDN project.
The Commander of the Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU), like the
Commander of the Naval Telecommunications Command, is a second echelon
commander reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Security Group
consists of commands of various sizes and at various locations. Some of the commands
are independent naval bases and others are tenants of naval or air force bases or army
posts. If applicable, a Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA) commanding officer may
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report to a base commanding officer or commander on matters relating to base
administration and to the local area coordinator for regional naval policy. Fleet
commanders may levy operational tasking on NSGA sites, but COMNAVSECGRL' is
the administrative manager responsible for ensuring the proper functioning of NSGAs.
COMNAVSECGRU has authority over NSGAs that are located throughout
the world. In addition to the field activities commanded by its own officers, the Naval
Security Group also mans a department in most of the navy communications stations
and communications area master stations. There are also Naval Security Group
personnel stationed at detachments remotely situated from parent commands and
members assigned to staff duty. Staff assignments could be to the COMNAVSECGRU
Headquarters staff in Washington, D.C., or to a number of other fleet staffs that require
cryptologic expertise.
Officers and enlisted personnel whose duties directly contribute to the Naval
Security Group operational mission are assigned appropriate designators or ratings that
identify them as cryptologic officers or technicians. This means that for the majority of
their careers these people will serve in billets under the purview of COMNAVSECGRU.
Navy personnel whose duties are in support of Naval Security Group facilities, such as
civil engineers and supply officers, are not permanently associated with
COMNAVSECGRU and usually serve only one tour in a Security Group capacity.
Within the Naval Security Group, manpower resources are divided into various branches
that identify areas of expertise, such as maintenance, administration, or
communications.
2. NAVSECGRU Communication
COMNAVSECGRU headquarters and field activities are divided by functions
that are organized in hierarchies similar to traditional naval shipboard organizations.
Depending on the size of the NSGA, its divisions and departments are arranged
according to functions such as operations, electronic maintenance, facilities
maintenance, administration, training, and communications. As previously described,
the communications systems of DoD and the Department of the Navy are upgrading to
packet-switched networks; the Security Group is no exception. All DoD cryptologic
elements will eventually participate in a packet-switched network for their special
community of interest under a project known as Platform [Ref. 10]. Just as the
cryptologic community's special communications system interfaces with the general
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service navy at ALTODIN switching centers today, the future system will interface with
DDN via interservice/agency automated message processing exchanges.
The Naval Security Group presently maintains its own communications
equipment that is compatible with the rest of the navy and DoD only through the
interfaces ofAUTODIN switching centers. To date, these interfaces have been sufficient
for interorgamzational communications. However, the advent of enhanced networking
functions (that will not be immediately available through automated message processing




Plans for DDN include expansion to a worldwide network. This requires every
aspect of DDN to be flexible towards additions and adjustments. Several noteworthy
DDN features have contributed to its initial success and will greatly enhance future
expansions. Three features contributing to the overall effectiveness and flexibility of
DDN are its survivability, availability, and security.
A. SURVIVABILITY
One outstanding attribute of DDN is its projected ability to continue to function
during a crisis. No system is invulnerable, but the goal ofDDN is to continue to provide
vital DoD communications after a disaster has occurred. Both natural and enemy
inflicted disasters can damage DDN. The natural types (earthquakes and devastating
storms) normally affect a limited geographic region that may not include many DDN
resources. The other types (conventional or nuclear attacks) more likely would affect
DDN since military installations would be probable targets.
Indications and warnings may precede full scale enemy attacks, but DDN planners
must also guard against the unpredictable possibilities of natural disasters and terrorist
sabotage. Individual users of DDN protect their communications equipment with the
same physical security measures that safeguard the rest of their base or post facilities.
The packet switching nodes of the shared backbone of DDN also benefit from military
installation protection because often the nodes are colocated with one of the subscribers.
Fences, sentries, and locked buildings are among the physical security measures that
protect DDN from threats against specific locations. The distributed nature of the
network as a whole contributes to its overall survivability. The loss of any portion of
DDN should not affect the operation of the remaining network.
Several survivability features are inherent to the DDN structure (see Figure 3 on
page 14). Features that contribute to DDN s present and ultimate ability to withstand
casualties include (1) redundancy, (2) dispersion, (3) dynamic adaptive routing, (4)
precedence, (5) graceful degradation, (6) hardening, and (7) reconstitution [Ref. 9:
p. 6-1,6-2]. Explanations of each of these terms follow.
1. Redundancy
A second set of equipment provides redundancy for any system. Most of the










Figure 3. DDN Features Related to Survivability. [Ref. 9: p. 6-la]
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considers packet switching nodes as back-up spares for each other because of their
similar operating capabilities. Each of the hundreds of packet switching nodes can
process traffic from any source.
The access portion of DDN also has redundant features. Critical users have
redundant access lines in addition to back-up computer equipment. This dual homing
procedure allows users to reach the DDN through secondary lines, should the primary
ones become blocked.
2. Dispersion
The geographical locations of the DDN switching nodes are widely separated.
This dispersion enhances survivability because damaged portions of the network can be
isolated. The large geographic spread of DDN backbone elements minimizes the
damage that any one disaster can inflict.
3. Dynamic Adaptive Routing
Routing routines or algorithms select the path for information to follow through
a communications network. Dynamic routing techniques allow two packets going from
one source to the same destination to take different paths. Adaptive routing allows a
packet to alter paths while in transit. DDN combines these two techniques into dynamic
adaptive routing. [Ref. 11: P. 150]
DDN routes each packet individually and updates the chosen route at each
switching node. Every node receives continuous updates on the status of all follow-on
nodes. The routing algorithms automatically send packets by the most expeditious
route. For survivability purposes, this enables packets to avoid damaged nodes.
4. Precedence
DDN packet switching nodes process messages on a first-come, first-serve basis.
Preemption mechanisms override this procedure to give priority to important
information. Prioritization schemes ensure that critical data go first.
DoD classifies each communication transmission into one of four precedence
levels ranging from routine to flash traffic. Mechanisms within DDN ensure that each
nodes processes messages according to precedence as well as to time in the system.
During peacetime, precedence procedures ensure faster delivery of time-sensitive traffic
even if the network is busy. During crises, precedence routines allow users to designate
which traffic gets priority on whatever network resources remain intact.
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5. Graceful Degradation.
Damage to isolated elements of DDN does not destroy the entire network. If
some disaster were to destroy a switching node, the users which normally access DDN
through that node would be without communications capabilities (they would probably
also be without a lot of other capabilities). Users with access to DDN through other
nodes could still have service.
DCA operates centralized regional centers to monitor the status of DDN at all
times. These monitors have an overall view of the network and assist with congestion
and equipment problems at nodes during peacetime. Should a portion of the network
be destroyed, the monitoring centers would probably use the remaining resources to
configure a limited network.
6. Hardening.
Structural reinforcement of buildings provides some protection against enemy
bombs. Most of the DDN switching nodes are located within a subscriber's facilities.
If the subscriber survives to use the node, the switching node should also be operational.
The survival of the trunks between nodes is not predictable because of the variations in
types (ranging from buried cables to satellite links).
Military planners safeguarding installations in the nuclear age must consider
other types of hardening besides strengthening buildings. All DDN components
eventually will have electromagnetic shielding and power surge arresting protection
against high altitude electromagnetic pulses.
7. Reconstitution.
Prior planning and preparation eases restoration efforts. Even with all of the
above-listed survivability features, some segments of DDN could become disabled.
After invoking all contingency plans to keep the network operating on a limited basis,
DCA will begin restoring DDN to full capability. DCA plans to construct five mobile
switching centers to assist network reconstitution efforts. After assessing the situation,
DCA will deploy these mobile nodes to provide packet switching during repairs of
permanent node sites. The construction of mobile switching centers will increase the
flexibility of DDN during peacetime as well as during conflicts.
B. AVAILABILITY
The DDN operates continuously for 24 hours every day. The traffic load may
increase during certain hours (daylight working hours for each time zone), but the
mission of DDN is to provide communications capabilities for DoD at all times. The
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DDN backbone always should be available for access by host computers and user
terminals. Three factors that directly affect DDN availability are the reliability of the
equipment, the size of the traffic load, and the accuracy of the network.
1. Reliability
The first area of concern for a network user should be his own equipment.
DDN subscribers must maintain their own data processing and communication access
equipment. Preventive maintenance measures as well as corrective repairs help ensure
proper functioning of DDN access equipment. The reliability of the access portion of
DDN varies from one subscriber site to another.
If the user's access equipment is working, the backbone should be able to
transport data. DCA repairs and replaces equipment for the DDN backbone. When the
backbone packet switch nodes are at a subscriber site, DCA assigns a local node site
coordinator. The coordinators work with DCA to maintain the packet switches.
Connectors between the switches, the interswitch trunks, also affect the
reliability of the backbone. DCA leases most of the interswitch trunk resources from
civilian communications companies. The responsibility for the operating conditions of
the interswitch trunks belongs to their owners.
The backbone components have performed well to date. DCA has set minimum
threshold standards and the operational components of MILNET have met these goals.
The minimum acceptable measure of reliability for switching nodes is 98.5%. This level
of reliability reflects the percentage of a given period of time that a computer is in good
working condition. The average reliability of MILNET packet switching nodes was
99.45% for the first nine months of 1987. [Ref. 12] Figure 4 on page 18 graphically
depicts recent node performance on a monthly basis.
The performance of the interswitch trunks has also exceeded management
thresholds. DCA demands a certain amount of reliability from its leased circuits but
must rely on the lessors to provide it. The minimum acceptable level of trunk reliability
is 97%, and the actual level for the first part of 1987 was 98.33% [Ref. 12]. Figure 5
on page 19 shows MILNET interswitch trunk performance for 1986-1987.
The composite system performance of the MILNET backbone is 98.89%
reliability. These solid performance statistics are not very reassuring when a user
experiences difficulty with the system. To assist users with problems, DCA operates a
network monitoring center. Node site coordinators contact the monitoring center for
troubleshooting assistance. DCA plans to establish more monitoring centers as DDN
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Figure 4. M1LNET Packet Switch Node Performance. (Ref. 12]
expands. This centralized coordination helps bring users back on line and disseminates
network status information.
2. Delay
Another important measure of the availability of a communications network is
the amount of time it takes for a message to reach its destination. Since DDN divides
messages into small packets, the delay time for any message depends on that of its
slowest packet. The performance of the network depends on its efficiency. Packet
switching overcomes inefficient procedures and delivers messages quickly.
High overhead is the primary inefficiency of packet switching procedures.
Overhead is any transmission information included in the packet that is not part of the
message or data flow intelligence. Each packet must contain its destination address,
packet sequence, and precedence information. Including these control items with every
packet instead of once per message results in duplicate information travelling network
resources.
The low message delay times of MILNET prove that disassembling and
reassembling messages into packets for transit docs not slow information exchanges.
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Figure 5. MILNET Interswitch Trunk Performance. [Ref. 12]
packet capacity, and it afTccts the network transmission speed. The average
source-to-destination (end-to-end) time for low precedence MILNET traffic within the
continental United States is projected to be less than 200 milliseconds (Ref. 9: p. 6-3a].
This speed would be fast enough for interactive use.
MILNET can often support query and response interactions as well as timely
acknowledgements during data transfer. 1 he 200 millisecond delay time averaged over
a 24 hour period docs not, however, accurately reflect the user's situation. Response
time during peak working hours may not be acceptable while the response time in the
middle of the night may be almost instantaneous. DCA strives to minimize delays at
all times and encourages users to postpone noninteractive, low priority traffic to slack
periods. As the number of subscribers continues to increase, DDN resources will have
to continue to expand.
3. Accuracy
Reliable, timely communications will benefit no user if errors occur. DDN is
available to users and is also extremely accurate. The system employs error detection
techniques to ensure error-free transmission through the access devices, access lines,
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switching nodes, and interswitch trunk circuits. The probability of an undetected error
getting through is extremely small, and errors that are detected can be corrected.
As discussed, packet switching divides messages into packets. Each packet
consists of a series of bits. Bits are binary digits; they are either zeroes or ones.
Computers use languages consisting of only binary digits to process data and to send
data to other computers [Ref. 13: p. 300].
The two bit states, zero and one, do not provide much information. Data
communications systems group bits together to form binary words. Transmitting words
through a communications system may require additional bits for network control or
error detection. The term frame refers to a binary word plus any control bits. As the
number of bits per word increases, so does the number of different combinations of bits
or separate words. Each digital system must use a code (such as the American Standard
Code for Information Exchange) to translate binary words into meaningful plain
language characters.
A DDN packet can contain up to 1008 bits [Ref. 14: p. 98]. For plain language
messages, a bit error may result only in a word misspelling and would probably not
affect the message content. For bulk data transfers, a bit error may be more significant
and not immediately noticeable. When the system does detect an error, the receiver
requests a retransmittal.
DDN uses techniques called 16-bit cyclic redundancy checks to detect errors in
the access and trunk circuits [Ref. 9: p. 6-3]. For each binary word, the transmitter
attaches a sequence of bits to make the entire frame exactly divisible by a predetermined
number. The receiver divides the incoming frame by this same number. If there is no
remainder, the receiver does not request a retransmission. The drawbacks of this method
are that it does not identify which bit is in error and it adds bits (overhead) to each
frame. It is, however, an extremely effective method.
The cyclic redundancy checks identify bit errors that occur during transmission.
DDN also has to detect errors during data processing. The subscriber computers use
an error detecting code that performs a summation operation on the bits [Ref.
2: p. 563]. These end-to-end accuracy checks are known as 16-bit checksums.
Determining the overall undetected bit error rate for DDN would depend on the
accuracy of each user's data processor. Also some errors may never be identified, so
meaningful statistics about DDN bit error rates have not been compiled. DCA projects
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that an undetected error will slip past all the error detection devices only once every
174,000 years [Ref. 9: p. 6-3a].
C. SECURITY
United States government agencies classify information according to its sensitivity.
The different levels of classification impose dissemination restrictions on certain
information. The restrictions are based on sensitivity level (confidential, secret, and top
secret) and on intended recipients (US and Allied governments, DoD, and various
departments within DoD). DoD assigns security clearances to all DoD personnel
handling classified information. The clearances designate the highest classification level
of information that each person can process. Within each level, the information is
limited again to only those who require the information for their official duties (need to
know).
Mechanical information processors also need security clearances. Identifying the
highest level of classified material that a piece of equipment can handle or process, helps
limit dissemination. Two areas for security concern related to DDN are communications
security and computer security.
1. Communications Security
Communications security involves the protection of information as it is
transferred from one location to another. Unauthorized listeners can eavesdrop by
gaining direct access to transmission lines (wiretapping) or by collecting signals in the
vicinity of transmitters or satellite terminals.
Encryption is the primary method for establishing communications security.
To encrypt information means to translate it to another form so that only receivers
knowledgeable of the translation code can understand the information. Encryption
guards against eavesdropping. Any information overheard will seem garbled to anyone
without the decryption key. Metallic shielding of equipment (referred to as Tempest
shielding) is the DoD technique that is used to contain signals.
DDN also attains communications security by separating DoD communities
that work with information at different classification levels. Each subnetwork uses
encryption devices to protect information from the time it is sent until it is received.
This compartmentation within DoD limits the chances for disclosures of sensitive
information.
Several segments of the DDN support classified data. Blacker front-end
computer devices, being installed in 1988, will ensure encryption of data sent from one
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host computer to another within a community. The Blacker devices between packet
switch nodes will enable separate classified networks to use the same backbone nodes
and trunk circuits. Guard gateway equipment, scheduled for 1992 development, will
eventually allow information to flow from a host in one segment of DDN to a host
computer in another segment.
MILNET, the primary focus of DDN for this study, does not support classified
data. Yet MILNET must still maintain security measures to prevent unauthorized use.
The cumulative effect of collecting unclassified official information traveling MILNET
over a period of time could result in sensitive disclosures. DDN has incorporated the
following services to safeguard against abuse of network systems.
a. Backbone Link Encryption.
DCA and DDN subscribers are in the process of installing KG-84
cryptographic equipment on all MILNET trunks between packet switching nodes and
on all access trunks between host computers and the backbone network. DCA will
acquire KG-84s for all hosts that are active before September 30, 1988. After that time,
new host subscribers must provide the cryptographic equipment for their end of the host
access circuits. These KG devices will encrypt all information that travels the DDN
backbone. [Ref. 15]
b. Terminal Link Encryption.
Low cost (approximately S100) encryption and authentication devices are
available for users to attach to terminal access lines [Ref. 16]. The placement of these
devices, known as LEADs, at user work stations will protect information as it travels to
host computers. Figure 6 on page 23 illustrates the use of encryption devices for access
links.
2. Computer Security
Computer security measures protect data processors from outside tampering
and unauthorized access. Today's data processing environment involves many user
terminals and local area networks connecting to one organizational computer. These
multiple access points create many opportunities for unauthorized users to gain entry
into the system. Physical security measures, such as those discussed in the survivability
section of this chapter, provide some protection against outsiders gaining access to
terminals. There are, however, dial-in telephone lines that may be used to reach DDN
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Figure 6. Access Links Encryption Environment.
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One solution for computer security in the DDN backbone would be packet
switch nodes that could keep information segregated according to classification levels.
These trusted nodes are discussed by Lane:
Today, the network cannot be trusted to properly segregate levels of information so
that only the intended recipient reads the transmission. Network switches
interconnecting host processors and terminals are themselves processors that cannot
be trusted to internally segregate information. The technology exists to build
network processors with trusted computing bases, which can be trusted to so
segregate, but to date such processors have not been fielded in an operational
network environment. [Ref. 17: p. 296]
Packet switch nodes that would separate data from various communities are the ideal.
The actual computer security features o[ MILNET include user identification
and authentication mechanisms. Access control systems require a user to input an
identification code (an alphanumeric sequence) and a password. The identification code
may be published in order for users to address mail to one another. Passwords are
known to authorized users only.
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IV. DDN SPECIFICATIONS
This chapter reviews the DDN standards that affect potential subscribers. DCA
imposes these standards to ensure that any DDN user can communicate with any other
DDN user. DoD organizations that anticipate DDN access should be aware of and
consider DDN specifications during the acquisition of any computer or communications
systems. The standards are intended to promote interoperability, not to limit flexibility
and innovation.
Sections A and B of this chapter describe the hardware and software aspects of
DDN. Every command has different needs and resources; these specifications are only
general descriptions of DDN options. Section C discusses some of the DDN acquisition
requirements and cost factors.
A. HARDWARE
For a computer or communications system, the term hardware refers to physical
pieces of equipment. DDN is an excellent example of the merger of computer and
communications technologies because its equipment performs many functions. A
computer that processes data can also enter that data into the network. Three functions
of DDN hardware are data transmission, data processing, and network access.
1. Data Transmission
Long distance information transmission takes place over the DDN backbone.
The interswitch trunks are the transmission lines that connect the packet switching
nodes. MILNET consists of over 300 leased circuits and satellite backbone links [Ref.
9: p. 5-2]. These links usually process binary information at a rate of 56,000 bits per
second [Ref 9: p. 5-4].
The standard DDN packet switching node consists of three types of
components, and takes up an area approximately seven feet high, ten feet wide, and
three feet deep [Ref. 9: p. 5-11]. One type of component is the cryptographic equipment
(KG-84 devices for MILNET). Another node component type consists of the circuit
terminating devices. The MILNET terminating devices are called modems
(MOdulator-DEModulators), data service units, and channel service units. These
devices convert signals to proper format for transmission. The third type of component
in the the packet switching node is a Bolt Beranek, and Newman C/30 computer.
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The C/30 is an extremely capable communications processor that is pro-
grammed to implement the DDN dynamic adaptive routing techniques. Depending on
a packet's origin and destination, the C/30 node can serve as a point of entry, a relay
station, or a point of exit for the DDN backbone. The Bolt, Beranek, and Newman
company has developed an improved C/300 computer that is compatible with the C/30.
DCA plans to convert existing nodes to the C/300 as each node reaches its previously
scheduled upgrade time [Ref. 18].
As of November 1987, MILNET had 174 operational packet switching nodes
[Ref. 19]. Each C/30 node can allow up to 30 host and 14 interswitch trunk connections.
To achieve maximum packet throughput rates, the nodes should have no more than
eight host and five interswitch trunk connections. The maximum throughput
specification for 750-bit packets travelling from one node to another is 175 packets per
second. [Ref. 9: pp. 5- 14a, 5- 15]
Each site that houses a DDN node must designate a node site coordinator to
interact with DDN program management and the monitoring center. Node Site
Coordinator is not a billet programmed into a command's manpower resources so it is
usually a collateral duty. During node installation or failure, node coordination can be
very time consuming. During routine operation, the time spent on custodial care and
administration can be minimal. [Ref. 19]
2. Data Processing
DDN subscribers use many types of computers to store and to manipulate data.
These computers range in size from small microprocessors to large mainframes. The
user applications of these computers range from word processing to mathematical
computation. Each DDN subscriber provides its own information processors, selecting
a computer size that meets its particular requirements.
The term host refers to any minicomputer or mainframe computer that uses a
packet-switched network to communicate. Every host site assigns a host site
administrator. This administrator registers all authorized host users and ensures
compliance with network policies and procedures. As local point of contact, the host
administrator works with the network monitoring center on host or user network
problems. [Ref. 9: p. 11-2]
Terminals are devices that allow direct interface between a user and a computer.
The user activates a terminal (usually through a keyboard) to transmit and receive
information. Some terminals act only as an interface device between the user and a
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separate computer. Other terminal work stations are an integral part of a
microprocessor (personal computer).
Manufacturers design terminals to work with a particular type of computer.
One major difference between terminal types is their synchronization schemes.
Transmitters and receivers must coordinate the timing of their communications. This
enables the receiver to keep track of the start and duration of each information bit,
word, or packet. Asynchronous systems signal the beginning and end of each
information character by attaching stop and start bits. Synchronous systems group
many information characters together and imbed the timing information in the data
signal. Synchronous transmission is a newer method than asynchronous transmission.
It is also more efficient because it does not add as much overhead data to the basic
message. [Ref. 2: p. 100]
Since DDN was based on older ARPANET technology, it was designed to
support asynchronous terminals [Ref. 9: P. 10-1]. Several DDN hardware devices and
software implementations have been created to accommodate synchronous transmission
and more sophisticated terminals.
3. Network Access
The access portion of the DDN encompasses a variety of computer and terminal
connections. Depending on location and communication requirements, a new subscriber
may have several alternatives for gaining DDN access. Some subscriber terminals and
host computers connect to devices that consolidate several users onto one DDN access
line. These devices conserve the limited number of switching node access ports. Options
for both host and terminal access methods are described below.
a. Hosts
Figure 7 on page 28 shows three configurations for attaching host
computers to DDN. They are (1) the direct method, (2) via a host front end processor,
and (3) via a terminal emulation processor.
(!) Direct. Mainframe computers can connect directly to a packet
switching node. This type of subscriber does not have to rely on any other access
equipment to reach the DDN backbone. It is not, however, a very efficient use of the
switching node access port. Another disadvantage of this simple method is that the host
computer resources must perform networking functions.
(2) Host Front End Processor. This processor converts all incoming data
from the host into formats acceptable for DDN transmissions. It performs the
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Figure 7. Host Computer DDN Connection Options. [Ref. 9|
networking functions and frees the host computer for data processing. The host front
end processor allows two hosts to use one DDN access port.
(3) Terminal Emulation Processor. This component allows terminals to
access their remote hosts through the network instead of via a dedicated line to the host.
This back door approach allows a host to communicate with terminals but not with
other hosts. The terminal front end processor will support up to 16 host terminal ports.
[Ref. 9: p. 5-21]
b. Terminals and Personal Computers
Several devices exist that enable terminals to transmit information.
Modems convert the data to a format appropriate to the transmission path. Terminals
connect to a DDN access component or a host computer by either dedicated circuits or
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dial-up telephone lines. DCA also offers toll-free (800 number) dial-up access for
terminals that can not reach a local network access component or a host computer [Ref.
20].
DCA has deployed a new device that provides an alternative to terrestrial
and telephone line transmissions. It is called a Very Small Aperture Terminal and it
allows high speed transmissions over long distances. The terminal uses a government
satellite to transmit and receive information at a rate of 56,000 bits per second. A total
of 12 of these devices were operational in 1987, and DCA projects that 100 will be
operational by the end of 1988. [Ref. 21]
DCA also plans to award a contract in 1988 for the delivery of items known
as packet assembler/disassemblers. These devices account for differences in terminal
types and facilitate communications. The ones developed under the DCA contract will
provide DDN interfaces for synchronous terminals. [Ref. 22]
Terminals and personal computers that are not tied in with host computers
can access DDN by three methods. Figure 8 on page 30 shows (1) a terminal access
controller, (2) a direct connection, and (3) a local area network connection.
(1) Terminal Access Controller. The terminal access controllers are
based on the same C/30 communications processors as are the packet switching nodes.
Each streamlines access to DDN by consolidating the inputs of 62 asynchronous
terminals into one line that connects to the switching node. Terminal access controllers
also assist network security efforts by requiring user identification. [Ref. 9: p. 5-17]
Another network access component is the miniature terminal access
controller. It differs from the regular controller in that it only has 16 ports and allows
synchronous terminal connections [Ref. 9: p. 5-20].
(2) Direct. Only personal computers that can function like host
computers can connect directly to a packet switching node. The microprocessor must
be able to support the interface software and a dedicated transmission line. This uses
up most of the personal computer processing capabilities and limits its usefulness as a
host. DCA also discourages this method because dedicating a node access port fulltime
to one small computer is not a very efficient use of packet switching node resources.
[Ref. 9: p. 10-12]
(3) Local Area Network. DCA has not yet standardized this final
method of connecting personal computers to DDN. A local area network configuration
would allow local interaction without DDN resources. A gateway device would function
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Figure 8. Terminal and Personal Computer DDN Connection Options. [Ref. 9|
like a host front end processor. It would perform the networking functions and free the
personal computer processing resources. When gateway devices become standardized,
this method will be an efficient use of node access ports. [Ref. 9: p. 10-13]
B. SOFTWARE
Hardware provides the physical connections; software allows communication.
Sending information between computers requires a type of language. Computer
operators must know the language (or proper sequence of actions at the keyboard) to
get the computer to function. Software programs and protocols supply these languages
for computer and communications systems.
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1. Programs
A program is a sequence of operations to be performed by a computer. A
person who knows how to code (write) a program can insert a sequence of operations
in the computer memory. An authorized user can then retrieve and run the program any
number of times. The number and length of programs stored in a computer depend on
its memory capacity. The speed and complexity of program operation depend on both
the programmer and the computer capabilities. In addition to accepting input from us-
ers who know programming languages, most host computers have useful programs
available to all users. The programs on DDN hosts and microprocessors vary from
computer to computer. Some examples of types of programs (names will vary) found
on many hosts include:
• Directory - lists names of stored files.
• Text Editing - facilitates word processing at the terminal.
• Message - creates and manipulates messages.
• Mail - sends and receives mail.
• Math - performs calculations.
• Statistics - helps prepare spread sheets.
• Record - saves a file of current video terminal display.
• Spell - verifies proper spelling of words in text files.
• Registration - provides current information about network users.
2. Protocols
Protocols are the sets of rules that govern the orderly exchange of information
between computers. ARPANET designers originated a set of standard protocols so that
participants could use different types and different manufacturer brands of computers
(heterogeneous computers). DCA continues to ensure interoperability among DDN
subscribers.
Stallings organizes the DoD protocol architecture into four layers. These are
called the network access layer, the internet layer, the host-to-host layer, and the
process/application layer [Ref. 2: p. 398].
a. Network Access Layer
The protocols in this layer provide for the transfer of data between
backbone and access portions of DDN. Packet switching nodes, hosts, and all other
network access components must implement these protocols. In addition to allowing
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data flow, these protocols perform error detection and message precedence functions.
The network access protocols used in DDN are:
• 1822. (This protocol was designed for ARPANET and is not intended for new
DDN subscribers.)
• DDNX.25. [Ref. 9: pp. 8-1,8-9]
b. Internet Layer
The protocols of the internet layer permit information to flow from a host
on one network, to a host on a separate network. The hosts and gateway devices must
support these protocols. The protocols for the DDN internet layer are:
• Internet Protocol.
• Internet Message Control Protocol. [Ref. 4: p. 15.5.6]
c. Host-To-Host Layer
The host-to-host layer protocols provide a connection between two hosts
that operate on the same network. These protocols facilitate data flow, detect errors,
and exchange control messages. The DDN host-to-host protocols are known as:
• Transmission Control Protocol.
• User Datagram Protocol. [Ref. 4: p. 15.5.6]
d. ProcessjApplication Layer
The fourth DoD protocol layer is the process/application layer. It allows
computer resource sharing and remote host access. The DDN process/application
protocols are listed below and described in chapter V.
• Telnet.
• File Transfer Protocol.
• Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. [Ref. 2: p. 399]
Some readers may be familiar with the International Standards
Organization communications model for an open system interconnection. This
organization developed its model after the ARPANET standards had been established.
The International Standards Organization had the same goal of achieving
interoperability among heterogeneous computers. The open systems interconnection
model divides the network protocols into seven layers as compared to the four layers of
the DoD protocol architecture.
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C. ACQUISITION
Current DDN user requirements far outnumber the connection capacity. DCA has
begun to develop a system to prioritize all requirements. Two other projects have been
initiated to help alleviate the backlog. The Very Small Aperture Terminal program is
providing more connection lines. The node upgrades to C/300 computers will provide
more access ports to each switching node. Despite these enhancements, projections are
that user requirements for host computers will continue to be greater than DDN ca-
pacity as shown in Figure 9 on page 34.
Given the current shortage of DDN access ports, it would be unrealistic to detail a
timely acquisition plan for DDN host computers for a worldwide organization such as
the Naval Security Group. On a priority basis, it would also be unrealistic to assume
that nonoperational requirements of the Security Group merit immediate MILNET
access. The premise of this thesis is that there presently are host computers and terminal
access controllers with available ports. Security Group entities that are located near
DoD communications facilities may have easy access to a host computer. Isolated
Security Group stations may be able to take advantage of the DDN centralized dial-up
(800 number) access.
1. Procedures
Potential subscribers that need host computer or dedicated terminal access must
fulfill a number of administrative requirements. The DDN Requirements
Implementation Manual contains the procedural information necessary to develop a
transition plan. DCA consolidates all DDN access requests in the User Requirements
DataBase. This data base supports DCA planning and prioritization. [Ref. 23: pp. 1,2]
Security Group sites will probably not request host connections. They may,
however, request access for one terminal. A direct connection between a user terminal
and a terminal access controller or miniature terminal access controller must register in
the User Requirements Data Base [Ref. 23: p. 7]. The first step is to submit completed
versions of DDN-MIS URDB Terminal Questionnaire Form (Form T-l) and
DDN-MIS URDB Connection Questionnaire Form (Form C-l) to the Naval
Telecommunications Automation Support Center [Ref. 23: p. 6]. Sites that wish to
access an existing host need only to coordinate with that host site administrator. The
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Figure 9. User Requirements versus Operational Hosts. (Ref. 18]
2. Cost
Access to DDN would requires initial implementation costs. A subscriber must
provide the terminal, modem, encryption/authenticator device, and packet
assembler/disassembler (if required). The price of these items depends on the
sophistication of the model purchased.
In addition to implementation costs, communication services have operating
fees. At the present time, DCA manages the Communications Services Industrial Fund.
This fund recovers the cost of providing DDN services by levying charges on the military
departments and any participating DoD agencies. The Commander of the Naval
Telecommunications Command supplies the Navy's fixed monthly payment to the
centralized fund.
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In fiscal year 1990, DCA will charge the DoD agencies and military departments
according to actual DDN usage. The Navy plans to bill each major claimant for all user
DDN charges. DCA is implementing these usage-sensitive billing methods to distribute
costs fairly and to promote network efficiency. The rates will be based on the total
number of operational hosts and access line costs. [Ref. 18]
The Commander of the Naval Telecommunications Command will program for
all Navy DDN costs for 1990 and 1991. Beginning with the fiscal year 1992 budget,
major claimants must submit projected costs based on past DDN usage. Given the
present situation of no DDN access, the major claimant COMNAVSECGRU will
receive no DDN funds.
3. Training
Any command that acquires a DDN terminal should make training aids
available. A list of DDN publications follows.
1. Navy Planning Guidance for Defense Data Network Implementation, October 1986.
2. Navy Requirements Implementation Manual for the Defense Data Network, Novem-
ber 1987.
3. Defense Data Network Qualified Host Interfaces, October 1987.
4. Exception to DoD Policy on the Use of DDN and Waivers From DoD Policy on Use
of Defense Data Network, November 1987.
5. Defense Data Network, undated.
6. DDN New User Guide, December 1985.
7. Network Usage and Cost Sensitivity, January 1986.
8. Methods and Procedures • Defense Data Network User Operating Procedures, April
1987.
9. Terminal Access Controller User's Guide, April 1987.
10. Node Site Coordinator Guide, September 1986.
11. DDN Node Planning and Engineering Guide, September 1986.
Users can obtain these documents from the Naval Telecommunications Automation
Support Center [Ref. 23: pp. 1-6]. Video courses are also available from the Support
Center and the Bolt, Beranek, and Newman Communications Company. Any individual
with a will to experiment can master DDN methods in a short time.
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V. DDN ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICATIONS
A. GENERAL APPLICATIONS
The computer and communication merger of the 1970s and 1980s is beginning to
impact many organizations. The overlap of the two technologies enables users to send
information directly from their work stations. Previously, data processors had to
transcribe information into hardcopy message form and deliver it to a central
communications center for entry into the long distance system.
The blending of computer and communication technologies into the common field
of information systems means enhanced networking capabilities. New computers are
more capable and more readily available. New communication systems are faster and
more versatile. The users of many types of computers in many locations now share data
and information.
The networks of shared resources span long distances. Traditional information
transfer methods (such as paper mail, recorded messages, and telephones) are not
becoming obsolete. Instead, automatic network functions are increasing the amounts
of information that each organization can handle [Ref. 24: p. 76]. Remotely separated
associates who formerly exchanged only formal correspondence and reports can now
quickly share databases, exchange inquiries, and provide feedback.
Anticipating potential applications for long distance networking requires some
imagination. As wide area networking begins to support full interaction between
different types of computers, users will probably discover many new capabilities and
applications. Oliver expresses this probability in the context of the implementation of
an electronic mail network for the civilian company Federal Express:
People's view about whether to have a telephone once depended upon whether they
thought nobody had one or everybody had one. The same with office copy
machines and overnight express. Once the habit was accepted, it became an
expected way of doing business. [Ref. 25: p. 166]
The transition to DDN will force DoD managers into considering the benefits of a
resource sharing network. If changes occur rapidly, the use of network services could
become commonplace before the full deployment of internetwork gateway devices. Fully
compatible gateway devices have yet to be developed. It is conceivable that a large
portion of DoD could be using electronic mail and transferring data files over MILNET
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while those organizations still using AUTODIN or another network would be unable to
participate.
The Naval Security Group does not plan to access MILNET or any of the classified
segments of DDN directly. A worst case (but possible) scenario of the future is one
where NSGAs are among the few Navy entities that do not have DDN addresses in a
DoD directory. The NSGAs could still send and receive official messages but could not
take advantage of electronic notes, DoD electronic bulletin boards, and other valuable
information services. This scenario is not too far-fetched when one considers that the
Standard Navy Distribution List is scheduled to be available for public access on DDN
in 1988 [Ref. 26]. It will contain the electronic mail addresses of those commands that
accept electronic mail.
This chapter suggests possible administrative DDN applications for the Security
Group. Ideally, all of a command's divisions and departments would be connected to
an unclassified local area network that would have a single line to the nearest DDN host
or node. More realistically, these proposed applications are based on the assumption
that each Security Group entity could obtain at least one DDN-compatible
microcomputer. There are not enough applications to justify the purchase of a host
computer. Instead, the access to DDN could be through a base host computer or
directly to the nearest terminal access controller. The terminal should be located in a
centralized place away from the processing of any classified material. Some commands
might place the DDN terminal in the Career Counselor's office or on the Quarterdeck.
Other commands might choose the Administration Department spaces.
1. Administration
Every Naval Security Group entity needs administrative support. The
centralized administration department or division monitors the correspondence and
record keeping of a command. Every letter to be signed by the commanding officer must
first pass through Administration. The personnel assigned to Administration already
operate a variety of word processing and automatic data processing equipment. They
would need only a minimal amount of training to operate DDN-compatible terminals.
Administrative cryptologic technicians work in the operations, communications,
and electronic maintenance functional areas. They prepare letters and messages and
maintain appropriate filing systems. An ideal goal of NSGA's is to have all
administrative personnel connected on a local network.
37
The Security Group does not have base local area networks yet. There are,
however, many ways the Administration departments could benefit from MILNET. The
first way that MILNET could help would be by eliminating some formal
correspondence. The following paragraph from the "Correspondence Management"
chapter of the Navy Correspondence Manual indicates that alternatives to formal letters
are desirable:
Preparing correspondence is time consuming and expensive. Don't write unless you
must. A conversation in person or by phone often saves two letters, the one you
would have written and the one the other person would have answered with.
Conversations are often better than correspondence for working out details that
require give and take. You can always confirm a conversation by a memo to the
other person or a memo for your records. [Ref. 27: p. 10-1]
The networking functions of MILNET offer an informal way to communicate without
going through the timely process of routing a typewritten letter through the chain of
command for release. Follow-up memos would not be necessary because users can
record and store electronic conversations taking place over MILNET.
In addition to correspondence functions, NSGA Administration Departments
supervise the command's performance with regard to periodic reports. The reports range
from manpower allowance figures to Inspector General Inspection follow-ups. The
cognizant departments submit reports to the Administration Department for the
Commanding Officer's signature. A wide area network like MILNET could facilitate
COMNAVSECGRU's call for these reports. Each command could store recurring
reports on the microcomputer and then easily update and amend them for submission.
2. Personnel
A separate activity or detachment performs most of the personnel support
functions for the Naval Security Group. Even though NSGAs do not handle most of
the official service and pay record functions, they do have an obligation to ensure that
all personnel are receiving proper service and fair entitlements. As the Navy Finance
Center and Personnel Support Activities and Detachments transfer to DDN, accurate
and timely information about personnel matters will be available. Two payroll and
financial systems scheduled for DDN access in the near future are the Joint Universal
Pay System and the Automated Budget Interactive Data Environment System [Ref. 28:
p. 6]. Access to MILNET would enable Naval Security Group managers to be informed
liaisons between their sailors and personnel support groups.
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Another area with planned DDN applications is the military health services.
The Triservices Medical Information System and the Defense Eligibility Enrollment
System are both slated for DDN access [Ref. 28: pp. 5-6]. NSGAs that provide medical
and dental services should be aware of the availability of medical record keeping systems.
3. Supply
The Navy Supply System is already converting to DDN. The Navy Stockpoint
Logistics Integrated Communications Environment is one of the first sets of networks
to begin its transition to DDN. It is a system of local area networks that support the
automatic data processing functions of Navy stock points and inventor.' control points.
Two Stockpoint Logistic host computers are operationally attached to DDN packet
switch nodes, and 22 more are scheduled to become operational [Ref. 12].
The amount of supply and logistics staffing needed for NSGAs varies from site
to site. A command that is a tenant on a base may only need a few storekeepers within
the electronic maintenance department to handle the operational equipment inventories.
A self-sufficient, isolated command needs a full department of Navy Supply Corps
personnel. Coordinating a timely connection to MILNET with the Supply Corps may
prevent these departments at NSGAs from becoming isolated from their parent
communities.
4. Public Works
Some NSGAs have Public Works departments that either directly maintain base
facilities or work through contractors to maintain them. These construction and
engineering personnel plan and coordinate most of their projects over unclassified DoD
communication circuits. If the Navy Civil Engineering community shifts to DDN,
NSGA Public Works personnel may miss out on opportunities to network with both
their military bosses and civilian project points of contact.
5. Staff Elements.
Security Group personnel serve on shore-based staffs of Fleet Commanders in
Chief as well as that of COMNAVSECGRU. Allowing these individuals access to
MILNET may facilitate better coordination with their counterparts. As DDN usage
grows, Security Group personnel filling staff billets may find themselves the last to find
out about other staff elements' positions on topics that are informally discussed over
DDN. If Navy organizations begin to rely heavily on MILNET, it may become difficult
for the District of Columbia COMNAVSECGRU Headquarters staff to coordinate with
other Washington agencies such as Naval Telecommunications Command or Space and
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Naval Warfare Systems Command. A hypothetical example is: if someone sends out a
DDN electronic mail note to all concerned parties about a meeting, they may not
remember or care to notify the cryptologic element by other means.
6. Collateral Duties
Many of the time-consuming collateral duties performed separately at each
NSGA could be streamlined through networking. The physical fitness coordinator at
one site could share with others the most efficient statistical spread sheet to use for
tabulating physical readiness test data. A Command Automatic Data Processing
Security Officer could compare his station instruction with those of other sites.
Combined Federal Campaign and Navy Relief fund raisers could coordinate with other
organizers. In many instances, morale probably would be improved by any offers of
assistance and the knowledge that others are performing the same collateral duties.
B. DIRECT APPLICATIONS
1. Electronic Mail
In the broadest sense, electronic mail is defined as a system of electrical devices
that send messages. This defmition could include the telex and facsimile message
systems that are used by many civilian communities. Telex consists of teletypewriter
telegraphs connected to telephone lines. Facsimile machines scan printed, graphic, or
handwritten pages and then electronically transmit the contents over telephone lines
[Ref. 29: p. 133].
In the context of DDN and most other computer networks, electronic mail is a
network function that allows the exchange of messages from one computer terminal to
another. However, electronic mail notes, memos, letters, and data are not presently
considered to be standard Navy messages. They differ from telex, facsimile, and
traditional Navy messages in several ways. The primary' difference is that electronic mail
routes information directly from the sender's terminal keyboard to the receiver's terminal
display. Traditional methods require message originators to print the information at a
device that is physically separate from the communications system.
Another way that electronic mail differs from standard Navy messages is
accountability. Electronic mail does not segregate messages according to classification
and precedence levels. AUTODIN and DDN assign DoD messages an identification
number consisting of the date and time of origination and all messages are retained for
a certain number of days. The DDN electronic mail system is not standardized. Some
40
host computers only keep track of electronic mail messages that are sent, and others
indicate to the originator the time of receipt of a message at the destination terminal.
Electronic mail is a fairly new concept in networking for DoD. Organizations
are still experimenting with procedures and applications for electronic mail. The Naval
Data Automation Center is the largest Navy organization now using DDN on an
operational basis. They have used electronic mail for internal project management and
for financial transactions with field stations (Naval Regional Data Automation Centers).
Based on their experience and a Joint Chiefs of Staff policy memorandum concerning
electronic mail, the Data Automation Command has established some electronic mail
guidelines that may benefit other organizations. The guidelines emphasize that this mail
system is not a service of DCA but is instead procured and funded by the users. [Ref.
26]
The Naval Data Automation Command based their electronic mail policy on a
traditional mail room concept. Postal service letters can be either formal or informal
depending on who signs them, whether they are on official letterhead paper, and whether
they were serialized by the mail room. Similarly, electronic mail can be routed through
a mail room type of terminal for each command. Serialization by the mail room will
identify an item as official. [Ref. 26] This type of centralized control mechanism could
be adapted to an NSGA administrative DDN terminal. An accountability log would
deter frivolous use of the system.
The DDN electronic mail service does allow users to send messages directly to
other users' terminals. The specific capabilities of the mail handling programs vary from
one host computer to another. Most of the mail programs feature the following
commands:
• Send. Users can initiate, forward, or respond to messages from their terminals.
• Read. Message headers may be viewed first and then individual messages may be
displayed.
• Print. The print capability depends on the availability of a printer for the user's
terminal.
• Move. Recipients can store incoming messages in files or delete them. [Ref. 5:
pp. 25-26]
a. Advantages
Subscribers can use electronic mail as a substitute for the telephone. When
interactive dialogue is not necessary, a message sent electronically can provide
information or ask questions. Recipients can research their responses and answer at
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their convenience. This system circumvents the telephone tag games of callers trying to
find their points of contact at their desk and free to answer. Within DoD, electronic
mail alleviates struggles to find a free AUTOVON line and solves the problems
associated with large time zone differences. Electronic transfer of notes also allows
precedence systems of the network and prioritization by the recipient to take place
without affecting the initiator.
In many instances, electronic mail can replace postal, speedletter. or formal
message services. Electronic mail facilitates networking at interorganizational levels
lower than that of commanding officers.
b. Disadvantages
The major drawback of electronic mail is the negative reaction by DoD
organizations reluctant to change. Many that have implemented electronic mail have
used it only on an informal basis similar to the use of telephones. However, unlike the
telephone, electronic mail provides a written record of correspondence which may later
be used for accountability purposes. Commanding officers will have to establish internal
and external command policies governing the official status of electronic mail. As
electronic mail becomes more accepted, DoD organizations will have to meet the
challenges of security, authentication of sender, and guarantee of delivery [Ref. 17:
p. 294].
c. Security Group
The Department of the Navy Correspondence Manual allows for electronic
mail as a promising method of communications [Ref. 27: p. 10-4]. Potential applications
for Security Group elements include:
(1) Career Counseling. Sailors could easily update preference cards.
Detailers could submit latest assignment possibilities. Neither party would be put on the
spot to respond without time for some consideration.
(2) Legal. The answers to legal questions must often be researched.
Legal officers in remote sites such as NSGA Adak, Alaska, could tap into the expertise
of the COMNAVSECGRU headquarters legal staff.
(3) Sponsors. Streamlining the flow of information between sponsors
and people changing duty assignments may ease the transfer process. Last minute
schedule changes could be shared rapidly and conveniently.
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(4) Travel. Questions regarding temporary additional duty assignments
could be directed to the appropriate point of contact. Travel arrangers could exchange
the latest lodging and accounting information.
2. Telnet
The telnet function of DDN permits a user working at one host to operate as
if he were signed on to another host computer. This remote log in capability enables the
user to access databases, run programs, and perform other operations as if the resources
were on his own computer [Ref. 5: p. 34].
The telnet function is easy to use. The DDN New User's Guide lists the
following steps for running telnet:
• Log in to an initial host.
• Invoke the telnet program on that host.
• Identify by hostname or host address the remote host you wish to access.
• Once connected to the remote host, log in with user name and password for that
host.
• When finished working on the remote host, type the command to log out. Then
break the connection. You are now back where you began on the initial host. [Ref.
5: p. 35]
a. Advantages
Large data bases can be centrally maintained and updated. Information
resources can be shared by all authorized subscribers. Telnet allows remote users to run
programs within their intended computer environments. It also spares users of large
data bases or long programs from having to obtain adequate local storage capacity.
b. Disadvantages
Data base managers must implement protective measures to prevent
tampering. Resource centers which allow users to add or change information in addition
to reading files must authenticate the identity of the users and verify the input.
c. Security Group
(1) Bulletin Boards. Electronic bulletin boards are an easy way to
disseminate information to network users. These centrally maintained newsletters or
data tables can be valuable resources. Telnet allows users from any host to access DDN
bulletin boards.
(2) Maintenance. The new Security Group electronic maintenance
equipment requirements system involves the transfer of inventory lists recorded on
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floppy disks. Implementation of DDN's telnet function would be more efficient than
mailing diskettes all over the world.
(3) Communications Security Material System. The Director of the
Communications Security Material System has begun to automate the distribution of
cryptographic keying material. As the system evolves to one of bar-coded inventory
procedures, Security Group sites could accomplish the unclassified bookkeeping over
MILNET.
3. File Transfer Protocol
The file transfer protocol capability allows for the transmission of an entire file
from one computer to another. Since files can contain data, programs, or text, this
function has a variety of applications.
To access a remote host, a user must identify that host name and address. A
valid user name and password for the remote host are required. Users can protect their
files by identification codes. Only authorized files can be received and sent during the
file transfer process. The DDN New User's Guide general steps for transferring a file are:
• Log in to the local host, and invoke the file transfer protocol program.
• Provide the host name or host address for the remote host.
• Once connected to the remote host, log in with user name and password.
• Issue commands to copy or send files.
• When finished, log out from the remote host, and exit from the file transfer proto-
col program. [Ref. 5: p. 32]
a. Advantages
Data base managers can use the file transfer protocol to send entire files of
data within their original file structure. This would allow the receiver to manipulate the
data with the same statistical spread sheet functions. The expertise and power of a
computer program stored in a file can be shared immediately. Text files can be drafted,
sent, revised, and returned any number of times with the file transfer protocol.
b. Disadvantages
Transferring text files to be edited does not preserve the original or denote
the author of individual changes. File transfers can be lengthy so the procedure must
be conducted at low priority in the network.
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c. Security Group
Security Group personnel could benefit by sharing programs they have
developed. In addition, the DDN Network Information Center provides user assistance
and computer operations references to all subscribers.
(1) Text Files. Documents sent to NAVSECGRU headquarters for
submission to other authorities such as awards boards could be transferred as a files to
allow for easy revisions.
(2) Command History. Submission of the annual command historical
reviews by electronic means would facilitate easy paperfree storage in a central data
bank at COMNAVSECGRU headquarters.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The technical information presented in this thesis demonstrates that DoD
communication methods are becoming decentralized. On a broad scale, the AUTODIN
switching centers will be replaced by hundreds of DDN packet switching nodes. On a
smaller scale, DDN now distributes to the numerous user input terminals many
communication functions that were previously handled by communications centers.
One can only guess at the extent to which DDN will become an interoperable wide
area network for DoD. The office automation functions that local area network
operators now enjoy could become standard for all of DDN. Naval Security Group
entities may not be able to participate in this communications revolution if networking
over DDN becomes common before NSGAs develop the capacity to use internetwork
gateways and interservice 'agency message processing.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn, based on the information reviewed for this
study.
• MILNET is operational and performing well for a limited number of users.
• Packet-switched networks offer valuable networking resources that no other DoD
telecommunications system offers.
• Electronic mail is a promising communications tool that has not gained complete
acceptance by DoD, but that appears to be growing in popularity.
• DDN billing methods are in a period of transition.
• DDN acquisition procedures require advance planning.
• The Naval Security Group is not presently planning to access the DDN directly.
• If the Naval Security Group were to support direct-access DDN services, the fol-
lowing benefits could be realized:
1. Improved networking capabilities between Naval Security Group sites and other
DoD commmands.
2. Increased sharing of resources and ideas among Security Group personnel.
3. Expanded administrative communications capabilities for exasperated
AUTOVON users and for Security Group personnel isolated by time zones.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings and analysis of this thesis result in the following recommendations.
• Naval Security Group personnel who are involved with the transition of DoD
cryptologic communities to a separate packet-switched network should study the
DDN lessons learned, and apply them wherever possible during network
development.
• NSGA department heads and communications managers should become familiar
with MILNET and with the communications procedures of staff communities such
as Supply Corps and Civil Engineer Corps.
• Each command located near an available DDN host or terminal access controller
should investigate the feasibility of connecting at least one terminal to that host,
so that existing DDN communications capabilities can be used as soon as possible
for Security Group functions.
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